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Recent Cases
Attorney liable for
bad title opinion
despite warranty
In Avco Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Ramsey,
631 So.2d 940 (Ala. 1994), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a
lender may recover damages from an
attorney who pursuant to a title search,
issued a warranty deed guaranteeing
property with an outstanding mortgage
as being free and clear of encumbrances.
Additionally, the supreme court determined that the lender was not required
to proceed against the property's grantor
for breach of warranty of title prior to
seeking a judgment against the attorney.
A Faulty Title Opinion and Bankrupt
Debtors
In 1990, Fred and Rosemarie
Kilcrease applied for a loan from Avco
Financial Services, Incorporated. Part
of the Kilcreases' loan was to be secured by Alabama real estate which
they had received from Mrs. Kilcrease' s
mother. Avco retained attorney Richard
H. Ramsey IV to perform a title search
and issue a title opinion regarding any
existing encumbrances on the property
from Mrs. Kilcrease's mother. Ramsey
concluded that the property was free
and clear of encumbrances. Relying on
Ramsey's title opinion, Avco approved
a $16,000 loan to the Kilcreases, and
issued what it believed to be a first
mortgage on their property as a security
for the loan.
The Kilcreases paid Avco on their
loan monthly for approximately one
year. After a year, they defaulted on
their mortgage. Subsequently, Avco
received notice that the Kilcreases had
filed a bankruptcy petition. Avco first
learned about the existence of a prior
mortgage on the Kilcreases' property
during the Kilcreases' bankruptcy proceeding. The first mortgage was executed by Mrs. Kilcrease's mother to
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First Alabama Bank in 1989. This prior
mortgage encumbered Avco's creditors'
rights in bankruptcy against the
Kilcreases. As a result, Avco filed suit
against Ramsey pursuant to the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act, Ala.
Code Section 6-5-570 (1975), seeking
damages for harm proximately resulting from his failure to discover and
disclose the pre-existing mortgage on
the Kilcreases' property.
Trial Court FindsAvco Failedto
Mitigate Damages
The trial court determined that
Ramsey did not act in accordance with
legal professional standards when he
neglected to disclose the pre-existing
mortgage on the Kilcreases' property.
Additionally, the court found that Avco
relied on Ramsey's title opinion in its
decision to render the Kilcreases a loan.
Nonetheless, the court entered a judgment against Avco, holding that Avco
failed to mitigate damages. Thus, the
trial court prevented Avco from collecting damages against Ramsey.
The trial court based its decision on
an expert conclusion that Avco could
have stopped bankruptcy proceedings
against the Kilcreases and foreclosed
on the second mortgage on their property. The expert also testified that the
deed from Mrs. Kilcrease's mother to
the Kilcreases guaranteed title of the
property against any mortgage not listed
on its face. Thus, the deed's failure to
disclose a first mortgage to First Alabama Bank constituted a breach of warranty. The expert further maintained
that foreclosure by Avco on the property would invest in Avco the right to
sue Mrs. Kilcrease's mother for breach
of warranty.
Avco subsequently appealed the trial
court's decision to the Supreme Court
of Alabama.
The Duty to Mitigate Damages
The Supreme Court of Alabama began its analysis of the trial court's opinion by stating that all parties who seek

damages from another possess a duty to
mitigate their losses. However, the rule
of mitigation applies only if a court can
infer from the evidence presented that a
claimant failed to act as an ordinarily
prudent person would have acted under
similar circumstances to minimize her
losses.
The supreme court next outlined the
criteria for evaluating whether a claimant has complied with her duty to mitigate damages. First, an injured party
must take all reasonable steps to reduce
loss. Second, when evidence presented
is susceptible to conflicting interpretations, a court deciding whether a claimant has complied with her duties to
mitigate must base its holding on the
facts of the case before it. Finally, the
rule of mitigation does not apply in the
absence of substantial evidence supporting an inference that the claimant
could have decreased her damages
through reasonable efforts and expense
and without undue risk.
Based on its evaluation of the duty to
mitigate, the Alabama Supreme Court
unanimously agreed with Avco's contention that the trial court erroneously
utilized this three-step mitigation analysis in the case at bar. The supreme court
found that the evidence presented at
trial did not support an inference that
Avco could have decreased its damages
through reasonable efforts and expense,
and without undue risk.
MitigationAgainst Mortgagees Not
Prerequisitefor Action Against Title
Guarantor
According to the trial court's application of the three-step mitigation analysis, Avco should have done the following to mitigate its damages: halt the
Kilcreases' bankruptcy proceeding;
foreclose on the Kilcreases' second
mortgage; and proceed against Mrs.
Kilcrease's mother for breach of warranty of title. The Alabama Supreme
Court questioned the legal propriety of
these mitigation possibilities. Furthermore, the supreme court found that even
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if the mitigation options were legally
proper, the trial court's conclusion that
Avco possessed a duty to mitigate its
damages against the Kilcreases constituted an unreasonable prerequisite to
Avco's right to sue Ramsey for his
faulty title opinion.
Additionally, the supreme court explained that the three mitigation options
offered by the trial court were incomplete, risky, time-consuming, and expensive. The court concluded that "(t)he
law of mitigation does not impose upon
the damaged party the duty to expend
good money to chase the bad; nor does
it impose upon the damaged party the
duty to first exhaust all other remedies."
Accordingly, the Alabama Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's decision, finding in favor of Avco.
-Judith Gorske

Uninsured motorist

coverage notice
held satisfactory
In Breithaupt v. USAA Property and
Casualty Ins. Co., 867 P.2d 402 (Nev.
1994), the Supreme Court of Nevada
held that USAA Property and Casualty
Insurance Company (USAA) provided
customers with satisfactory written notice regarding the availability of uninsured motorist coverage. In so doing,
the court refused to overrule legal precedent imposing a greater duty of notice
on the insurer. The court also declined
to apply retroactive disclosure laws upon
insurers because such measures would
not improve consumer awareness of the
benefits of purchasing optional uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.
The Notice Requirement
On April 4,1988, BarbaraBreithaupt
suffered severe and permanent injuries
in an automobile accident. While she
recovered the maximum amount from
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the other driver's insurance company,
this amount did not fully compensate
for her injuries. Breithaupt carried uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM)
coverage with USAA in the amount of
$15,000 per person and $30,000 per
accident for both of her vehicles. She
also carried bodily injury coverage of
$300,000 per person and $500,000 per
accident. In order to provide Briethaupt
with maximum coverage, USAA allowed her to stack the UM coverage on
her two vehicles and paid her $30,000,
the full amount of her UM coverage.
Breithaupt filed suit against USAA
under a Nevada statute, NRS
687B.145(2), seeking reformation of
her automobile insurance contract. She
alleged that USAA failed to comply
with pre-1990 statutory language requiring the insurer to notify its customers that they could purchase UM coverage equal to the limits of bodily injury
coverage. In dispute was USAA's insurance renewal notice that included a
flyer describing both the nature of UM
coverage and the minimum coverage
which an uninsured motorist was required to purchase by law. The flyer
contained a section entitled: "Higher
limits are available." The higher limits
section discussed factors that an insured
should consider in determining the appropriate amount of coverage to purchase. The notice also stated:
"If you want to increase your UM
coverage, give us your order on the
order form on the back of this folder.
Available limits are listed in the box to
the right.
"IMPORTANT: The UM policy limits you select may not exceed the Bodily
Injury (BI) liability limits in your policy.
If you want to increase your UM to a
limit higher than your present BI, please
use the order form on the back to increase your BI liability limit."
To the right of this statement, USAA
listed "UM Limits Available." The list
included UM coverage of $300,000 and
$500,000.

Breithaupt contended that the insurance renewal notice failed to satisfy the
notification requirement under the Nevada statute because it was unclear and
ambiguous. She claimed that as a result
of these deficiencies, the court should
reform her contract with USAA to allow the UM limits of the policy to equal
the limits for bodily injury. Under a
reformed contract, USAA would provide Breithaupt with UM coverage of
$300,000 per person for each of her two
vehicles. Stacking this coverage would
entitle Breithaupt to $600,000 of UM
coverage, allowing her to recover an
additional $570,000 for damages sustained in her accident.
The trial court granted summary judgment for USAA, holding that the contract should not be reformed because
the written notice satisfied the state law
requirements. Breithaupt then appealed
to the Nevada Supreme Court.
Court Finds Full Disclosureof UM
Coverage
The Supreme Court of Nevada rejected Breithaupt's contention that the
insurance renewal notice was unclear,
ambiguous, and did not satisfy statutory
requirements. It agreed that USAA could
have made a clearer affirmative statement to Breithaupt that UM coverage
equaling her bodily injury coverage was
available. However, the court found that
the notice was sufficient to inform "the
average layman who is untrained in the
law or the field of insurance" that UM
coverage equal to bodily injury coverage was available.
In addressing the issue of notification, the court examined the language of
the pre-1990 version of the applicable
state law. In relevant part, the statute
provided that insurers "must offer uninsured motorist coverage equal to the
limits of bodily injury coverage sold to
the individual policyholder." The court
acknowledged that "must offer" was
susceptible to a variety of interpretations, each imposing a different duty of
notice upon the insurer. In its discus125

